Three Challenges in the U.S. Labor Market: Participation, Inequality, and Fluidity

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World Bank Group January 28, 2016



- 1. Strength of the Labor Market Recovery
- 2. Three Long-Standing Challenges:
 - a) Labor Force Participation
 - b) Income Inequality
 - c) Labor Market Fluidity
- 3. (Brief) Policy Implications

The Unemployment Rate Fell to 5.0 Percent in October, Years Ahead of Most Economists' Forecasts

Unemployment Rate and Consensus Forecasts



Note: Annual forecasts are current as of March of the stated year. Shading denotes recession. Source: Blue Chip Economic Indicators; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey.

Labor Market Recovery is Broad Based, But Still Some Elevation in the Broadest Measures and Long-term Unemployment

Tracking the Recovery Across Labor Market Indicators





Note: Unemployment rates by education are for persons age 25+. All other rates for persons age 16+ unless noted. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.

Nominal Wages are Rising Somewhat Faster Than Earlier in the Recovery, and Low Inflation is Boosting Real Wage Growth

Average Hourly Earnings Growth and Consumer Inflation 12-Month Percent Change 4.5 4.0 3.5 Average Hourly Earnings for all 3.0 Private Workers (Dec-15) 2.5 2.0 2010-2014 1.5 Average 1.0 **Consumer Price Index - All Urban Consumers** 0.5 (Nov-15) 0.0 -0.5 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

The First Challenge: Labor Force Participation



Note: Shading denotes recession. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. The labor force participation rate fell 3.4 percentage points from 2007-Q4 to 2015-Q4. This can be attributed to:

<u>Structural</u>

- 1. <u>Aging of the population</u>. This is the mechanical impact of, for example, having fewer 55-59 year olds (male LFPR = 77%) and more 70-74 year olds (male LFPR = 23%).
- 2. <u>Non-aging trends</u>. Male participation rates have been declining since the early 1950s and female participation rates have been declining since the late 1990s.

Cyclical

- 3. <u>Normal business cycle</u>. Historically, for every 1 percentage point elevation in the unemployment rate, the participation rate is 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points lower.
- 4. <u>Unusual business cycle</u>. The Great Recession was unusually severe and hit a labor market that has undergone structural changes, making the cyclical impact different.

Note – CEA's statistical analysis combines 2 and 4 as a residual.

CEA's Decomposition of the LFPR Decline

Labor Force Participation Decomposition

66.0 2015:Q4 65.5 Aging Trends 65.0 64.5 **Cyclical Effects** 64.0 Actual 63.5 Residual 63.0 62.5 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Percent of Civilian Non-institutional Population Aged 16+

Note: Year axis denotes first quarter of year noted. See 2015 *Economic Report of the President* for methodological details. Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; CEA calculations.

The Case for the Residual Being Unusual Business Cycle (i.e. Hopefully Cyclical)



Regression of Quarterly Differences in Detrended Participation Rate

Independent Variables (Year-over-Year Differences)							
Unemp. Gap	Unemp. Gap (t-4)	Unemp. Gap (t-8)	Mean Duration	Mean Duration (t-4)	Mean Duration (t-8)		
- 0.0330* (0.00914)	0.00429	0.0151 (0.0114)	-0.00406 (0.00534)	- 0.0142* (0.00524)	0.00222		

Note: Regression is estimated using data from 1960:Q1 to 2014:Q2. Newey-West standard errors using a maximum lag of 12 are reported in parentheses. Participation rate and unemployment gap are detrended using the procedure described in Appendix A. F-tests are joint significance tests of the disability insurance, mean duration, and schooling variables. * p<0.01.



Labor Force Participation vs. Pre-Crisis Structural Projections

Structural Declines in Employment-Population Ratios



Prime-Age LFPR Across G-7 Economies



Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Prime-Age LFPR Across OECD Economies



Prime-Age Male Labor Force Participation

Prime-Age Female Labor Force Participation Percent of Population



U.S. Labor Market Has High Flexibility But Low Supportiveness

OECD Measures of Labor Market Flexibility	US Percentile Rank (100=Most Flexible)
Overall Labor Market Regulation	100
Employment Protection for Regular Employment	100
Scope of State Intervention	94
Minimum Cost of Labor	92
Coverage of Collective Bargaining Agreements	90
Labor Taxation	71
Barriers to Entrepreneurship	62

OECD Measures of Institutional Labor Market Support	US Percentile Rank (100=Most Supportive)
Expenditure on Active Labor Market Policies	3
Net Childcare Costs, Lone Parent	6
Implicit Rax on Returning to Work, Lone Parent	9
Unemployment Benefits (1 Year)	11
Unemployment Benefits (5 Years)	11
Number of Weeks Lost Due to Sick Leave	11
Net Childcare Costs, Couples	13
Implicit Tax on Returning to Work, 2nd Earner	13
Tax Wedge: Single Earner vs. Second-Earner Couples	25
Public Expenditure for Childcare	29

The Second Challenge: Income Inequality

Top 1 Percent's Share of Income Rose from 8% in 1970 to 18% in 2014



Note: Data for all countries exclude capital gains. Source: The World Wealth and Income Database.

The "Competitive" Explanation of Inequality: Skill-Biased Technical Change, Job Polarization, and Globalization

Change in Employment by Detailed Occupation, 1989–2014



Note: Excludes five small outlier occupational categories.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; CEA calculations.

The "Competitive" Explanation of Inequality: Skill-Biased Technical Change, Job Polarization, and Globalization



The "Rents" Explanation of Inequality: Income Differences May Reflect Non-Competitive Rent Collection Rather than Productivity Differences



Note: The real interest rate is defined as the nominal U.S. Treasury yield less the trailing 1-year rate of CPI inflation. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis; Robert Shiller (Yale University).

The "Rents" Explanation of Inequality: Income Differences May Reflect Non-Competitive Rent Collection Rather than Productivity Differences

la du star	Percentage Point Change in Revenue Share Earned			
	by 50 Largest Firms, 1997-2007			
Transportation and Warehousing	12.0			
Retail Trade	7.6			
Finance and Insurance	7.4			
Real Estate Rental and Leasing	6.6			
Utilities	5.6			
Wholesale Trade	4.6			
Educational Services	2.7			
Accommodation and Food Services	2.6			
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services	2.1			
Administrative/Support	0.9			
Other Services, Non-Public Admin	-1.5			
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation	-2.3			
Health Care and Social Assistance	-3.7			

The "Rents" Explanation of Inequality: Declining Union Membership May be Driven by and May Contribute to Rent-Seeking Behavior

Union Membership as Share of Total Employment and Share of Income Accruing Top 10 Percent of Income Distrubtion



Note: Total employment from 1901 to 1947 is derived from estimates in Weir (1992). For 1948 to 2014, employment data are annual averages from the monthly Current Population Survey. Source: Troy and Sheflin (1985); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; Weir (1992); CEA calculations.

The "Rents" Explanation of Inequality: The Prevalence of Super-Normal Returns Have Grown Over Time



The "Rents" Explanation of Inequality: Virtually All of the Rise in Wage Inequality is Due to Inter-Firm as Opposed to Intra-Firm Dispersion



<u>The Third Challenge</u>: Labor Market Fluidity Worker Flows have been Declining Since the 1990s



Source: Hyatt and Spletzer (2013); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey; Census Bureau, Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics.

Worker Flows have been Declining Since the 1990s



Worker Flows have been Declining Since the 1990s



Note: Shading denotes recession.

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics; CEA calculations.

Business Entry Rates Have Also Declined



	Data	Age		Gain to Switching
	Source	Group	Time Period	Jobs
Topol and Ward (1992)	LEED	18 to 34	1957:Q1 -	0%
			1972:Q4	9%
	PSID	22 to 29	1983-1994	4%
			1995-2001	10%
Molloy, Smith, and			2003-2011	2%
Wozniak (2014)	NLSY	22 to 29	1966-1981	7%
			1979-1994	3%
			2002-2011	4%
	LEHD	25 to 55	1995:Q2	8%
Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer (2012)			1999:Q2	14%
			2001:Q2	6%

Wage and Earnings Gains Associated with Job Switching

Note: Topel and Ward (1992) and Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2014) are wage regression models, while Fallick, Haltiwanger, and McEntarfer (2012) use sample earnings medians from job switchers. All regression 26 estimates are statistically significant, except for the Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak (2014) estimates from the 2000s.

Occupational Licensing Has Grown & Interstate Mobility is Much Lower for Workers in Licensed Occupations



Source: The Council of State Governments (1952); Greene (1969); Kleiner (1990); Kleiner (2006); Kleiner and Krueger (2013), Westat data; Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2010-2013; CEA Calculations. 27 Number on left chart is calculated from an OLS regression controlling for race, citizenship, sex, citizenship, number of children, marital status, education, income, year, and state. Ages 25 to 65 were included.

Housing Supply Constraints Slow Income Convergence

Speed of Income Convergence Across States by Housing Supply



(Brief) Policy Implications

1. Improving labor force participation:

- Continue to strengthen the economy
- Flexible workplace practices including access to paid leave, paid sick days
- Greater access to high quality child care
- Reform taxes for secondary earners
- Training and other assistance finding jobs

2. Reducing inequality:

- Education from early learning through college and apprenticeships
- Raise the minimum wage and support worker voice
- More progressive tax system, including expanded childless EITC
- Product market reforms to promote competition

3. Promoting more fluid labor markets:

- Occupational licensing reform
- Reducing land use restrictions
- Wage insurance to support job transitions

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